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I  Two Problems
	The law recognizes certain types of saying as wrongdoing.  There is thus a category of language crimes and, in many of its instantiations, sexual harassment falls into this category.  Curiously, given its prevalence, verbally harassing behaviour is little discussed in the literature.  One reason for this is that the cornerstone of liberal morality in much of Europe, North America and elsewhere is the principle associated with the name of John Stuart Mill to the effect that the conduct of an individual should be free from interference by the state except in circumstances where such conduct causes harm to persons other than the perpetrator.  Combine that principle with the premises that words are not deeds, and that deeds alone can cause intended harm, and it is easy to reach the conclusion that there can be no such thing as verbal misconduct that could be subject to law.  The argument, of course, is flawed, because although words are not deeds, words are used to perform speech-acts, and such acts are indeed deeds.  Once the flaw has been exposed, the way lies open to addressing the problem of how to legislate in this area.
But how can one legislate on sexual harassment when, notoriously, no clear definition of the term has gained general currency?  A new problem then arises of either supplying a definition of the term or of showing that the quest for such a definition is misguided.  I shall tackle these problems in reverse order, since the second might be regarded as more fundamental.  Notoriously, it is borderline cases that present problems for attempted definitions, and verbal behaviour presents particular problems for a definition of sexual harassment, because some types of verbal behaviour are sexual but non-harassing, even though they may be unwelcome or offensive.  It will be useful to describe such types of behaviour as one means of providing a context for the task of finding a definition – or of showing why the quest for a definition is fruitless.

II  Verbal Sexual Behaviour
As  Mane Hajdin, has pointed out, most sexual advances are not coercive in intent.  He writes:
Many of those who support the sexual harassment law in its present form or advocate its strengthening seem oblivious to the simple fact that the most typical reason for making a sexual advance is the hope that it will be accepted and that its acceptance will result in some kind of fulfillment and happiness for both of the parties involved. It is the neglect of that fact that has resulted in the lumping together, under the notion of hostile environment harassment, of bona fide sexual advances that turn out to be offensive and acts such as deliberate insults of a sexual nature.
The aim of a deliberate insult of a sexual nature is to give some kind of satisfaction to the person who is making it at the expense of the person insulted. In other words, its aim is to increase the well-being of the person making it by decreasing the well-being of the person subjected to it. And not only are deliberate insults intended to produce the decrease in the well-being of the persons to whom they are directed, but they almost always do in fact produce it.
A bona fide sexual advance is, on the other hand, aimed at increasing the well-being of the person making it without decreasing the well-being of the person to whom it is directed. In making a sexual advance, one normally hopes that it will lead to interaction that will be satisfying not only to oneself but also to the other person. In technical terminology this important difference between sexual advances and deliberate insults can be expressed by saying that bona fide sexual advances are aimed at producing a Pareto-improvement (at least so far as the people directly involved are concerned) while deliberate insults most definitely are not.​[1]​
Hajdin is making an important distinction here between a verbal sexual advance, perhaps a compliment or an invitation, made in good faith, which may turn out to be unwelcome, and an insult of a sexual nature issued with the intention to hurt.  Yet, as Hajdin points out, this distinction `often ends up being swept under the carpet in discussions of hostile environment harassment.’  Hajdin cites the case of Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) in which the male defendant, Sterling Gray, had written a note to a co-worker Kerry Ellison, in which he said: `I cried over you last night and I’m totally drained today… Thank you for talking with me.  I could not stand to feel your hatred for another day.’  If, as some writers have claimed, sexual harassment is simply a manifestation of the extreme loathing so many men bear toward women’​[2]​, then, since the note was anything but an expression of loathing – although it apparently made Ms. Ellison `shocked and frightened’ -- it should not, according to those writers, be viewed as sexual harassment.  Yet a federal court of appeals held that the writing of such notes could be so regarded.  What counted was that the woman became upset; the fact that the man could not reasonably have foreseen that the woman would find his note unwelcome was accorded little weight.  Mr. Gray was condemned not for his illocutionary act but for its perlocutionary effect, an effect that, arguably, a reasonable man could not foresee; and this seems to be a gross miscarriage of justice.​[3]​
The famous anti-pornography ordinance, drawn up by Andrea Dworking and Catherine Mackinnon was passed in 1984 by the Indianapolis City Council.  But both a federal district court and a circuit court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the negative liberty of free speech.  One of the judges made the point that the First Amendment is designed precisely to forbid the banning of speech on account of the message it contained.  The Indianapolis ordinance sought to ban pornography on the grounds that it conveyed the quite specific message that women are submissive and enjoy being dominated.  That message may be false or insulting but, according to the American Constitution, that is not grounds for banning it.  `The essence of negative liberty', writes Ronald Dworkin, `is freedom to offend'.​[4]​
Notice the huge discrepancy between what Dworkin is advocating and the decision in Ellison v. Brady.  Dworkin thinks not just that people should have the right to pornographic images for their own private consumption, but that they should also have the right to use these pictures with the express purpose of offending others.  Unless I am misinterpreting him grievously, what Dworkin is saying is that the freedom to engage in verbal sexual harassment is guaranteed by the First Amendment, and, moreover, that this is a freedom that we ought to celebrate.  At this stage, we might be forgiven for thinking that the law is in a mess.  Sensible, decent people, do not want verbal sexual harassment to go unpunished by law; equally, they do not want to see innocent people like Mr. Gray being punished by a law that is too crude.
What we should not lose sight of is the plain fact is that what we are here concerned with is a form of behaviour that good people are concerned to eradicate.  It is sometimes perpetrated with sexual congress as the goal, but is often simply a species of bullying,​[5]​ and it is very easy to describe paradigm examples of it.​[6]​  Applied linguists concern themselves with language in use, and there is quite a large literature on polite uses of language.   It is perfectly clear that language may be used in a great variety of harmful ways.   The applied linguist can therefore provide a practical service by delineating what Wittgenstein would have called the `language-game’ (Sprachspiel) of verbal sexual harassment.
Verbal sexual harassment is a perlocutionary act.  A speaker may achieve the perlocutionary effect of harassing someone by uttering certain words where, typically, the utterance of those words in different contexts will not have identical effects.  Thus, if I say `Your thighs are smooth as marble’ to a woman with whom I am enjoying an intense sexual relationship, the effect will be different from that achieved by saying those same words to a stranger whom I bump into in the street.  It is not the form of words, but `the whole consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven’​[7]​ that must be the object of investigation.  
Bullying is widespread, both in the real world, where thugs, terrorists, chauvinists and racists impose their will on the weak, but also, closer to home, at academic institutions where an insidious power structure can be exploited by the unscrupulous.  In the case of the latter, though knives are (usually) used only metaphorically, words can be used to discomfort or even to terrorize a victim – and we should include cases where the victim is someone maliciously and falsely accused of sexual harassment.  The regulations of Hong Kong University are in line with the federal court’s decision in Ellison v. Brady, for one of the circumstances in which sexual harassment is deemed to occur is `when one person makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual favours, to the other person’.  Perhaps the University would not follow the federal court in classifying notes like Mr. Gray’s as sexual, but it does not state anywhere what its criteria for being `sexual’ are.  This is another of those crucial issues that tends to get swept under the carpet.  If someone teaching one of the performing arts, such as drama or painting, cajoles the students, screams at them, even shakes them by the shoulder in order to raise their awareness and their intensity, is the instructor guilty of sexual harassment if, in this process, he or she frightens or upsets one or more of the students?​[8]​  Or is such behaviour more closely akin to that of a coach in a sports environment, where it is expected and accepted?  Examples like this make us wonder: Is there some phenomenon, sexual harassment, about the nature of which we are all pretty clear, but which is a little difficult to characterize, some characterizations being too wide in scope, others too narrow?  Or is it the case that there is no unanimity about what the phenomenon is, so that the project of finding an accurate description of it is doomed to failure?  If so, then either competing prescriptions will vie for acceptance or the concept will eventually be abandoned as confused.  The latter eventuality will not be equivalent to our giving up on the task of trying to eradicate a certain type of behaviour that decent people regard as pernicious.  It may mean, however, that the hope for a neat definition and a neat set of regulations may need to be abandoned in favour of a thorough discussion and a careful compilation of examples of the kind of behaviour deemed unacceptable in certain environments.

III  Definitions Descriptive and Prescriptive: A Case Study
It is quite easy to see why, in the area of sexual harassment, theorizing has so often proved so recalcitrant an endeavour.  One reason is that, when it comes to sex and sexual behaviour, people are often strongly opinionated, and scholars tend not to have the honesty or the objectivity or the ability to detach themselves from their own prejudices when writing in this field.  This may not a bad a thing if the scholar is motivated by duty and feels a personal involvement.  But we should be wary of advocacy that tries to pass itself off as objective analysis and, in its desire to promote a particular conclusion, ignores argumentative obstacles, or pretends that they do not exist.
Of course, in a dispute, one’s spade may ultimately turn on an opponent’s irreconcilable politico-ideological agenda, and an impasse may be reached.  Perhaps even we find ourselves talking past each other because the very senses of some of the crucial phrases we are using seem incommensurably different because shaped by our different cultural milieux.  But such possibilities should not inhibit us from digging as deeply as possible in the hope of finding common ground.  As Harriet Samuels says, `The courts clearly need to be sensitive to issues of culture but should not allow such arguments to undermine the attainment of equality by women in society’.​[9]​  The feeble and irresponsible postmodernist ploy of ridiculing the search for what is true and what is right, and hiding behind pretentious, obfuscatory prose, should be consigned to the grave that Alan Sokal’s magnificent hoax dug for it.​[10]​  It is all too easy (especially for those not affected by the consequences) to conjure up some confused line of thought leading to the conclusion that `sexual harassment’ must mean something incommensurably different for some other group, that liberty is a Western notion, so that liberty is not morally right for a non-Western culture etc..  Christine Loh has said `When attempts are made to justify tyranny on grounds of history or culture, such attempts are invariably made by those who are practicing the tyranny.  Never by the victims’.​[11]​  Loh is not quite right.  Academics masturbating intellectually in the safety and security of their ivory towers are sometimes just as guilty of spurious justifications.  
Some writers essay to provide definitions of the various terms in the vicinity of `sexual harassment’ because, or so it is alleged, no serious discussion can take place until we have defined our terms.  Yet if anything is clear from Plato’s Socratic dialogues, it is that the project of defining terms is frequently unrealisable – there may, in principle, be no neat set of necessary and sufficient conditions fixing the extension of the term in question.​[12]​  Offering a definition may lend a specious respectability to one’s writings on a subject, but the really serious writer will reject the unwarranted imperative to supply definitions or will take the trouble to offer some argument that, in some particular case, a real definition is possible and desirable.​[13]​
The phrase `sexual harassment’ started being used in the mid-1970’s, and since then, innumerable articles have appeared in the scholarly literature attempting to define its meaning.  I have not counted the number of conflicting proposals, but should not be in the least surprised if it runs into hundreds.  Perhaps the very failure to reach consensus is an indication that the project is a futile one, but there is a more interesting explanation.  One may cite paradigm examples of the sort of behaviour that one wishes the phrase to embrace, and expect wide agreement that these are indeed paradigm examples.  A theorist might then point to another type of example case Ex2, which is very similar to one of the original paradigms Ex1, and so will wish to classify that as sexual harassment too.  Then that theorist, or another, will find a further type Ex3 rather similar to Ex2, and so on.  This may seem a perfectly respectable procedure, until we notice that, if we go on long enough, we shall arrive at examples which are very remote from the original paradigms – so remote, in fact that nobody in their right mind would wish to classify them as sexual harassment.  To be beguiled into doing so simply because of close similarity between neighboring exemplars is to be guilty of the Sorites fallacy.  But, and here’s the rub, there seems no logical point at which to stop the slide into absurdity, and that is one reason why some theorists have slid too far.
If the aim of finding an agreed description is unrealisable, then the project should be abandoned as misconceived, and instead one might try prescribing a clear meaning for the term.  In case law driven by precedent (stare decisis), a prescription is effectively made by an authoritative judge but, in most common law systems, this is not set in stone, since a higher court may revise that prescription and, typically, the highest court has the power to over-rule its own previous prescriptions.  Theorists and activists may offer their own competing prescriptions for the meaning of a term.
      As an example of the `prescription’ option, let us look at a recently published Encyclopaedia of Law.​[14]​  The author of the entry `Sexual Harassment’, one Anita Superson, writes 
 Traditionally, the law construes sexual harassment subjectively, as determined by what the victim feels and what the perpetrator intends. Victims must have serious cases of repeated incidents of harassment showing extreme emotional distress or tangible economic detriment. The law does not protect victims who are harassed by a number of different people, who have institutional power over their harassers, who do not complain out of fear, and who do not suffer grievous harm.
The traditional view puts the burden on the victim to complain and to establish that the behavior is unwelcome or annoying, or that it creates an intimidating and hostile environment. Many victims hesitate to complain for fear of repercussions. Victims often doubt themselves, partly because of the way women are raised and treated under patriarchy, partly because harassers often send ambivalent messages, and partly because of the way women are treated when they do complain. Many do not seek punishment of the harasser, but merely want the behavior to stop. Many have no other career and educational choices and must continue to interact with their harasser. Many women believe sexist myths and stereotypes and as a result do not recognize harassment for what it is (p.797).
What might strike one about this passage is that, as an encyclopaedia entry, it is very odd.  The entry begins `According to Anita Superson…’, not the dreaded `According to me…’ which might, God forbid, convey the impression that the author is voicing a personal opinion.  She purports to be setting out some facts.  Let us take her word for it that the law does not protect victims who are harassed by a number of different people (even though the meaning of that is unclear, and bearing in mind that the Hong Kong University procedures say that harassment occurs if … `the harasser, alone or together with other persons, engages in conduct of a sexual nature which creates a sexually hostile or intimidating work environment…’ [my italics]).  But Superson also gratuitously offers hypotheses about why victims hesitate to complain -- such hypotheses would be worth mentioning in a sociology text, but it is hard to see what place they have in a reference book on the philosophy of law -- and she also makes certain assumptions, for example that society is patriarchal which, though she must know many of her readers would not accept them, she does not trouble to defend.  Superson then lists some cases where, in her view the courts got it wrong and did not punish what she takes to be clear cases of harassment.  She goes on:
Harassing professors try to justify their behavior on the grounds that they are bombarded daily with the temptation of provocatively dressed young women, as if the students’ apparel indicated that they welcomed the treatment. As with the case of rape, the perpetrator’s behavior is often excused because it is natural, uncontrollable, and flattering, and the victim is judged as being too sensitive and too easily annoyed or offended. Judges have ruled that women working in a `man’s world’ must come to develop a thick skin and put up with this `normal’ behavior, instead of requiring or even expecting men to change.
Superson gives no evidence for these accusations, and cites no cases, but giving her the benefit of the doubt, let us assume that such evidence is available, and that judges have ruled in the way she says they have.  Does she mean that judges have found a defendant guilty of sexual harassment, but have let him go unpunished?  No, what she means is that the defendants in question have been found not guilty of sexual harassment as that concept is understood by the law.  So what she is really saying is that the law’s conception of sexual harassment is not what she would like it to be.  This becomes evident when, in the next paragraph, Superson lays her cards on the table:
Feminists have offered an objective definition of harassment designed to cover even the most seemingly minor cases of harassment. They take sexual harassment to be any instance of behavior by a member of the dominant class that expresses and perpetuates the attitudes that a member of the subjugated class is inferior because of her sex. This definition has the advantage that it recognizes the harm done to all women by a single instance of harassment: the behavior reflects and reinforces sexist attitudes that women are inferior to men and ought to occupy certain sex roles (for example, sex objects, motherers, nurturers). It also has the advantages that it prevents the harasser from claiming innocence because he did not believe the woman was bothered by his behavior, and it allows for a case of harassment to be made even when women are reticent to complain.
It is quite clear that, in this claimed `objective definition’, Superson is prescribing what she and some fellow feminists would like the definition of `sexual harassment’ to be.  This is obvious from the fact that, in the sentence that concludes this paragraph, she says: `The definition must, however, be made consistent with freedom of speech’.  If the definition were merely an attempt to describe what sexual harassment is, there would be no question of trying to arrange for it not to be in conflict with something else to which we wish to hold fast.
A similar commitment to prescriptive definition is displayed in a paper by a group of Hong Kong women.​[15]​  These authors write:
Feminist theory argues that violence against women cannot simply be defined according to pre-existing legal categories. Instead, it is necessary to focus on women’s wide range of experiences of violence and abuse which may reveal the limitations of the legal categories. These experiences may appear trivial in men’s eyes, such as sexual harassment at work, and may not be defined by the law as serious or criminal, such as street harassment. Nevertheless, they cause intimidation, fear, terror, and other psychological trauma to the recipient ….. In addition, acts of abuse and harassment may not be carried out with the intention to cause harm. However, it is the effect on women rather than intentionality that is of concern. Therefore, from a feminist perspective, it is inadequate to define violence against women in terms of physical harm and intentionality.
The definition adopted by the U.S. National Research Council can be seen as influenced by the feminist argument (p.198).
This passage illustrates that prescriptive definition need not be arbitrary.  There may be good reasons for wishing to reject an old definition as unhelpful.  It also illustrates the interesting interplay between prescriptive and descriptive definition.  Presumably Tang et al. would wish to see the definition adopted by the U.S. National Research Council accepted as a description of the sort of behaviour that right-thinking people ought to condemn under the name of `sexual harassment’.  A new definition of the term in the legal context may well impact on the vernacular, helping to sharpen awareness (men’s in particular) of the fact that certain types of behaviour, whether so intended or not, cause harm to women. 
Returning to Superson, in her final paragraph, after she has been talking about woman-battering, she makes it quite clear that she sees fit to use her allocated space in the Encyclopaedia to engage in polemics.  She writes:
The debate is not as much over whether battering has occurred as it is over how much women can be expected to endure. Feminists want to eradicate the view that women deserve abuse because they are to blame for inciting their abusers and for being unable to control them. Feminists want to eliminate sexism in society so that women truly have options other than remaining with abusers and men are not taught that abusing women is a sign of masculinity. Better police protection and legal remedies are required.
	Now, although an enyclopaedia may not be the proper place for standing on a soapbox, at least Superson makes no bones about what she is trying to do.  Hers is an ideological mission to change the meaning of the phrase `sexual harassment’ in such a way that its extension becomes much enlarged.  Some people may think that political action of this sort is not appropriate in an academic setting, but that is probably a mistake.  In the recent infamous case of Robert Chung which led to the resignation of the then Vice-chancellor of the University of Hong Kong, the complaint against Chung allegedly made by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong was that he was conducting research that was likely to be biased by his own political commitments.  Yet the view that prevailed was that he was entitled to do so as an exercise of his academic freedom.
It would be absurd to think that, in conducting research on social issues, investigators always take the view from nowhere, that their research is not skewed towards their own perspectives.  Indeed, people doing research on social issues often get involved in a particular study because they themselves have strong commitments to a certain position, and pursue their investigation not with saintly detachment but with missionary zeal.​[16]​  Hijacking the meanings of words can be a part of this exercise.  After all, the meanings of words do change over the course of time.  Sometimes this is because ignorant misuse becomes widespread and so acquires the status of accepted use, enshrined in dictionaries.  Sometimes words change their meaning under the pressure of advances in scientific knowledge.  Sometimes new meanings get added to a word just for fun.  So it is hardly surprising that ideology is another force for meaning-change.
Yet, once we recognize this fact, we shall become alert to the possibility that, in an ideological battle, conventions of intellectual respectability may not be respected by all parties.  If we are being invited to condemn as immoral certain types of behaviour that, to date, have escaped the legal net, then, as Crosthwaite and Swanton point out, the conception of sexual harassment that is being recommended `should be informed by an adequate conception of the point of so classifying the phenomena.  This point is given by an account of the disvalue which is the basis of our interest in and objection to sexual harassment.’​[17]​  Modern manuals of child-rearing concur: Don’t simply tell the child `No’; explain why not.  Superson proselytizes, where what Crosthwaite and Swanton recommend is careful explanation.   The same may be said about the academic crime of plagiarism.  Some students (and some teachers too) may think that the effort of searching the web for information, assimilating it and fitting it seamlessly into an essay deserves credit rather than punishment.  For such people, an explanation of what is wrong with plagiarism needs to be supplied.  Such an explanation is readily forthcoming: to fail to acknowledge (by omitting quotation marks, reference to sources etc.) amounts to deception if, by such concealment, the author is attempting to pass that material off as his/her own.  (If someone really believes that this kind of deception is not wrong, then this would be the kind of situation alluded to above, when we are close to where one’s spade turns.)

IV Harmful Uses of Language  
In a forthcoming very interesting book on language and the law, John Gibbons (at one time a lecturer in Education at Hong Kong University) discusses `language-crimes’ -- language behaviour that can be the object of legal action.​[18]​ Gibbons lists a variety of crimes committed by performing some kind of illocutionary act: `offering a bribe; accepting a bribe; threats; extortion; perjury; suborning a person to a language crime; soliciting an illegal act (eg. hiring a hitman); using foul language.’  The list is, by Gibbons’ own admission, incomplete, but he does, usefully, include a section on how words can wound -- though omitting any discussion specifically on the language of sexual harassment.  Gibbons does, however, talk about racist language as a subject for law, and his illustration of how hate language can lead to hate action, will serve our purposes here.   There is, Gibbons notes,
a long history in Europe of negative construction of the Jews. As early as the 15th century in Austria they were depicted as eating Aryan children. There was also a well established 19th century negative stereotype of the ghetto Jew. In much of the adult and children's literature of the Nazi era ethnic groups are portrayed in terms of Germanic myth: the Germans are portrayed as 'Ubermensch' (supermen) and Aryan knights, while the Jews are described as 'sly' 'egotistical' and 'cunning'. This develops into the portrayal of Jews as 'Untermensch' (subhuman) and 'racial monsters'. Other terms used are 'criminal', 'parasite', 'germ', 'maggot on an open wound' and the 'Antichrist'. They are portrayed in both word and image as 'vermin'. A normal response to parasites, germs, maggots and vermin is to kill them. This is the verbal means by which a basis for genocide can be constructed. However, while Jews are constructed negatively, their genocide is constructed positively - the word 'killing' is never used in the bureaucratic structures used to carry out the Holocaust. Instead we read of 'The Final Solution to the Jewish Problem' (die Endlösung der Judenfrage). The bureaucrats consistently refer to 'evacuation' and 'resettlement' to the extermination camps. The crematorium was a 'bakery'. (There are parallels in more recent language - particularly the terms 'ethnic cleansing' and 'collateral damage'.)
As this example shows, language may be used to incite violence and to construct stereotypes, and may be used also by the perpetrators to disguise the true nature of their acts and diminish their significance.  These types of behaviour are prominent in the arena of sexual harassment, where words are used to bully and intimidate, and where other words are used to mask or excuse such behaviour.
We have suggested that bullying is one of the types of behaviour that we quite properly disvalue and, as our examination of Hajdin should have made clear, the use of sexual insults and other verbal abuse that is sexual in nature is a form of behaviour that we should seek to curb.  According to an old proverb, `sticks and stones may break your bones but names will never hurt you’.  This is true, but only in the trivial sense that words are not heavy objects that do damage by crashing into you.  As J.L. Austin pointed out, and as was noted above, we typically do things with words, and our utterings can have seriously damaging perlocutionary effects.  Among these effects may be distress gratuitously caused to our audience.  So there is a moral issue, recognized by many harassment codes (including that of the University of Hong Kong), about what kinds of speech act are, and which are not morally impermissible.​[19]​  Talk of the moral impermissibility of words may raise the hackles of many.  The feeling would be that freedom of speech is a cherished value that must be preserved at all costs, so that even so-called `hate speech’ should be protected.  This view which, if Ronald Dworkin is right, is enshrined in the American Constitution, rests on a confusion between words and their use, to which post-Austinians ought to be immune. 
To illustrate this point, let me begin with an anecdote.​[20]​ On Glasgow Central Station, I caught sight of a large billboard showing a photograph of a youth, his face horrendously bruised and zipped together with two long lines of suture.  Under the picture was the message `Sectarian jokes can leave you in stitches’ -- a joke about jokes, although you weren't really supposed to laugh.  The intended ambiguity (exploiting two senses of `stitch’) does not exactly have you in stitches.  But the sentence `The policeman told our reporter that he saw a drunk lying on the platform of Glasgow Central Station; he had a long slash on his face’ would be generally reckoned much more amusing.  If you don’t get it, the point is that the final clause can mean either that X’s face was sliced by a sharp instrument or that Y slashed (urinated) on X’s face.  So it is not ambiguity simpliciter that is funny, but only certain kinds of ambiguity, and it is a deep mystery why one ambiguity is appealing, another not.  This example raises a problem, though.  Some readers may find it offensive, unfunny or genuinely upsetting because it contains what, on one reading, is a vulgar expression (`slash’ being roughly equivalent to `piss’).  Other readers may be unfazed by the vulgarity; still others may revel in it because they find such language attractive and pleasurable to use.  It is hard to see how one group could talk the other out of its viewpoint.  What are our moral obligations to those -- perhaps a small minority -- who strongly dislike such expressions?  Should we censor?
Ronald Dworkin contends that people have deep-seated and diametrically opposed views on abortion so that legislation is as inappropriate in this area as it would be in the matter of religious faith.​[21]​  Some critics of Dworkin claim that reason will ultimately disclose the moral truth about abortion, so that the search for well-justified legislation should not be abandoned.   The case of vulgar expressions, of which, of course, many are sexual, suits Dworkin’s argumentative strategy better than does abortion. Certain vulgar expressions disgust some people and delight others.  It is fatuous to suppose that reason will ultimately deliver a principled ruling on which expressions are morally permissible, which not.
It does not follow that the use of any such expressions, under any circumstances, is morally permissible.  Even if cutting up the flesh of dead animals is not in itself morally unacceptable, it would be insensitive, bad manners, and simply wrong to prepare raw meat in front of a vegetarian friend, and to do so repeatedly, knowing the disgust it caused, would constitute sarcoid harassment.  Likewise, it may often be wrong to tell a joke about death to a friend who had been recently bereaved, but perfectly all right to tell the same joke to other people.  If we are interested in the question of the moral permissibility of forms of speech, it seems that what we should be looking at are not just the words used, nor their sense and reference but, in J.L. Austin’s phrase, `the total speech act in the total speech situation’, a notion rather close to the Wittgensteinian `language-game’ mentioned earlier..
There is a thin line dividing a healthy liberal commitment to pluralism, and a cowardly and irresponsible adherence to relativism.  There may be occasions when it is legitimate, because morally proper, to tell jokes with the clear intention of shocking or offending.  Perhaps one’s particular audience needs to be jolted out of prejudice or complacency; perhaps treating a subject with humour may help loosen the grip of stifling taboos or the unquestioning perpetuation of traditions and cultural values that might be revealed, by fair examination, to be pernicious.  But there are other occasions when one should refrain from engaging in a form of verbal behaviour in the company of people who one knows will be offended by it, even though one does not begin to understand why they are offended.  This would be in civilized recognition of the fact that others' values may differ from one’s own but are deserving of equal respect.  Obviously if the exercise of such self-restraint is not merely blind, one must have knowledge of the values of one’s audience, and in some cases, for example, where women’s sensitivities are foreign to a man, that man may need to apprise himself of and, ideally come eventually to appreciate, what may formerly have seemed to him an alien viewpoint.  In the article previously cited by Crosthwaite and Swanton, the authors spell out in some detail, what is required of a man in this regard:
The norms of interpersonal behaviour which are determinative of adequate consideration of interests in the case of sexual or sexually motivated behaviour in the workplace are the following. (For ease of reference we will refer to the agent or instigator of behaviour as ‘the man’ and the subject or recipient is ‘the woman’.)

(1)   In his interactions with her, the man must have a satisfactory attitude to the woman. This concerns viewing her as a moral person rather than as an object of his actions – an attitude which has several features.
(i)	He should see the woman not simply as someone he can use to fulfill his own aims or intentions, but also as someone having needs, intentions, and wishes of her own.
(ii)	Given that he perceives the woman in the above way, he should be prepared to test his assumptions about what those needs, intentions, and wishes are.
(iii)	He should see the woman as someone potentially having influence on him and not simply as someone upon whom he can have influence. (It’s no use testing his assumptions unless he is prepared to be influenced by the results of those tests).
(iv)	He must see her as having free choice to modify or even to opt out of the interaction he purposes.
(1)	The man must possess not merely the right attitudes but also possess and exercise a satisfactory level of interpersonal skills in his interaction with the woman.
(i)	He must check his attitudes and beliefs about the woman by adequately monitoring her signals. A man may fail to do this because he does not believe this to be necessary (in which case we have an attitude problem under (1)), or because he reads the signals incorrectly. (We do not wish to assume here that the man fails under (i) if the woman does not give signals or gives misleading signals…...
(ii)	The man must bring to the interaction a degree of openness about his aims which enables the woman to make responses based on fact rather than misperception. He must disclose his intent in a way which is not deceitful, and which is also neither coercive not semi-coercive. Disclosing sexual attraction in a way which makes the woman feel that failure to reciprocate will lead to professional reprisals, is not being open in an adequate way.​[22]​ 
Some men will find this manifesto offensive, on the grounds that it seems to assume that men are so stupid as to need coaching in very elementary forms of social behaviour, but I think that we might also regard the passage as indicative of the sorts of humiliation and indignities that the authors have personally suffered at the hands of inadequate men.​[23]​  And since these authors are themselves academics, it does not take a genius to further infer that the guilty include male university teachers.  This would suggest that the information pack that universities typically issue to new staff should include not just the usual rather brief regulations on sexual harassment, but a `coaching manual’ along the lines of Crosthwaite/Swanton, with special attention paid to verbal sexual harassment since this is a type that is somewhat prevalent in a university setting.
One important and desirable feature of that manual is that it avoids the sexist assumption that all women have the same reactions.  The man is enjoined to test the waters in each individual case, to `adequately monitor’ the signals of each particular woman with whom he interacts.  Some will think this far too demanding a requirement but, I shall argue, it is not stringent enough.  A male teacher may make a sexual advance on a particular student – let us suppose that he compliments her on her prettiness within the earshot of other students.  Now, even though the addressee is not in the least offended by the compliment, in fact welcomes it and gives every indication of doing so, the teacher could rightly be accused of sexually harassing behaviour towards those other students in the vicinity whose reactions he had not adequately monitored.  They could, with some justice, regard him as contrasting their own appearances unfavourably with that of the addressee who had been singled out.  They would be right to regard the teacher’s sexual compliment as an unwarranted reward for a favourite.
An interesting variant is the situation in which, in her absence, a teacher makes sexual remarks to a person or persons about a particular student where, had he adequately monitored that student’s prior behaviour, the teacher would have realised that she would have found these remarks upsetting if made in her presence.  That someone can be harassed even though not aware of the relevant behaviour when it occurs was established in an American case, Liberty v. Walt Disney World.​[24]​   A similar case, one discussed by Crosthwaite and Swanton and reported in The New Zealand Herald 14/9/1984, Section 1, p.16, concerned facilities in a workplace `where eight peep-holes were found giving a view into the women’s showers and changing room to occupants of chairs carefully arranged for the purpose in a service corridor’ (p.94).   The first complaint of sexual harassment tried in Hong Kong, likewise involved voyeurism though not in real time, thanks to the use of a concealed camcorder.​[25]​   It seems clear that in all these cases there was  behaviour of a sexual nature or motivation characterized by inadequate consideration of the interests of the person subjected to it, which is what, for Crosthwaite and Swanton  counts as sexual harassment in the workplace (p.100).
Another important aspect of the Crosthwaite/Swanton emphasis on how differences between individual women need to be respected is that it avoids the category of `the reasonable woman’ that looms so large in discussions of harassment – an act, so it is often claimed, is sexually harassing if `the reasonable woman’ finds it so.  But the question of what behaviour is felt to be hurtful is not a matter of reason or reasonableness.  Some women will sleep with a man on their first date, others would not dream of doing so.  What would the reasonable woman do??!!  One woman accosted by a male stranger bent on upsetting her by heaping sexual abuse might find the performance comical, even endearing, while another woman similarly accosted might be sickened to the stomach.  We can sensibly talk about how a reasonable person would think, but not about how a reasonable person would feel.  It does not seem correct to follow Crosthwaite, Swanton and many other feminists in designating an act sexual harassment by reference to its effect on the woman.  The man’s intent in both cases was identical, and it would be unjust for him to escape censure in the first.  One possible route for those favouring the feminist view would be to advocate the establishment of a legal category `attempted sexual harassment’ where a man behaves in such a way that he could reasonably expect that the woman would be offended by it.  He can form a reasonable expectation only if he has previously carefully monitored her signals.

V  Constructing Regulations
	Where sexual violence of a verbal or non-verbal sort is perpetrated, there is clearly a need for regulation, procedure and penalties.  If what I have argued is correct, then guidelines of the sort used at Hong Kong University and at other comparable institutions are not really of much use, since they omit rationales of the sort offered by Crosthwaite and Swanton, and rely on short definitions that will not cope with the hard cases.  Perhaps a long definition would be of more help.  One thinks of the Dworkin/Mackinnon anti-pornography ordinance previously mentioned.  It runs as follows:
We define pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context which makes these conditions sexual.
But I think that even so explicit a definition is inadequate – do people who are not sure of the meaning of `pornography’ have a better grasp of the meaning of `graphic sexually explicit subordination of women’?  What is really needed is first, a careful explanation of the demands on conduct and, second, a rather large series of case studies, real or imagined, available to all employees, which make it perfectly clear what sorts of sexual behaviour are considered inappropriate within a work context.  This will go some way to ensuring that those who are apt to engage in such conduct will have fair warning.​[26]​  Another reason for advocating such detail in the guidelines is that legislation loosely framed, is open to abuse, and leaves too much scope for the vexatious accuser. As things presently stand, there are no sanctions whatsoever prescribed for such accusers and one possible reason for this is that, with loosely framed legislation, it is obvious that such an accuser could always claim that he or she adopted a broad interpretation.  Feminists may wish to avoid this issue, for, they might argue, sanctions against a vexatious accuser might deter a woman from lodging a justifiable complaint, for fear that it should be regarded as frivolous or vexatious, rendering herself liable to punishment.  It is true that this is a real risk, and the only proper response is to carefully describe what is to count as a genuine cause for complaint, so that potential accusers can be reasonably certain, in advance, whether their proposed accusation is likely to succeed.  The alternative – fixing no penalties for vexatious or malicious accusers – is quite irresponsible, given the damage that such accusations can cause to the reputation of the accused, to his health and to the well-being of his family.  For good illustration – in fiction, but perhaps deeply rooted in fact -- see John Coetzee, Disgraced and Philip Roth, The Human Stain.
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